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National Unity versus Multiculturalism? Rethinking the Logic of Inclusion in Germany and Canada*

Abstract

This paper examines the relationships between national divisions, multicultural inclusion and ethnicizing discourses in Germany and Canada. It maintains that the inherent logic of multiculturalism, defined as the extension of social and political inclusion of culturally diverse populations, runs along similar lines in both cases. The outcome, however, varies in each country due to different national images that have been shaped over time. Juxtaposing the evolution of national integration and ethnocultural pluralism in both countries leads to a provocative hypothesis: Whereas the inclusion of East Germans by the German reunification led to the ethnicization and exclusion of "foreigners," the ethnicization of Québécois nationalism produced a counter-image that facilitates the inclusion of culturally diverse immigrants into the Canadian state-nation.

Résumé

Cet article se penche sur les relations entre les divisions nationales, l'inclusion multiculturelle et les discours ethnicisants en Allemagne et au Canada. Il soutient que la logique inhérente au multiculturalisme, défini comme l'extension de l'inclusion sociale et politique à des populations aux cultures différentes, a emprunté des cheminements semblables dans les deux cas. Ceci dit, les résultats varient d'un pays à l'autre, du fait de la diversité des images nationales découlant de leurs expériences historiques. La juxtaposition des expériences vécues par les deux pays dans l'évolution de l'intégration nationale et du pluralisme ethnoculturel mène à la formulation d'une hypothèse provocante. Tandis que l'inclusion des Allemands de l'Est dans le contexte de la réunification de l'Allemagne a conduit à l'ethnicisation et à l'exclusion des « étrangers », l'ethnicisation du nationalisme québécois produit une contre-image qui facilite l'inclusion d'immigrants aux cultures diverses dans l'État-nation canadien.

In 1971, two years before the recruitment of "guest workers" ended in Germany, Canada established "multiculturalism within a bilingual framework" as a state policy. In thus giving official recognition to the multicultural composition of its population, Canada became the first country to develop a normative approach towards the group identities and solidarities inside its borders. Its policy recognizes a multitude of "ethnic communities" within the framework of the English and French "founding nations." The unifying, multicultural, pan-Canadianism, that in recent

decades took root in the English-speaking parts of the country, has made Canada "a world leader in three of the most important areas of ethnocultural relations: immigration, indigenous peoples, and the accommodation of minority nationalism" (Kymlicka 1998: 2-3). However, with respect to Quebec separatism, critics and defendants of multiculturalism alike also point to Canada to demonstrate the detrimental effects of normative pluralism. For some authors, the "Quebec syndrome, or the Yugoslav syndrome," to use Glazer's (1998: 46) allusive comparison, seems to be fostered by multiculturalism policy. Other interpretations imply a scenario where two fundamentally opposed visions of nationhood engage in a Canadian version of Huntington's "clash of civilizations." In this perspective, Québécois "Language-Ayatollahs" are held responsible for the "balkanization" of one of the most "cosmopolitan" countries of the world (Wieland 1997). At the beginning of the 21st century, Canada thus presents a paradox: While it serves as an example of the multicultural reconstruction of national imagery and citizenship by state authorities, the cleavages between the two linguistically defined "founding nations" seem to put at risk the very existence of the state system.

Germany, by contrast, is notorious for its legacy as an "ethnic nation" and its blood-based citizenship law. In recent years, the acquisition of German citizenship by long-term "foreign" residents has gradually become a reality. Nevertheless, it is difficult to forget the wave of racism and violent attacks on "foreigners"¹ in the years immediately following reunification. In 1993, one year after the last attempt in Canada to recast the Constitution in ways acceptable to Quebec, Germany changed its *Grundgesetz* (Constitution) to reduce the intake of asylum-seekers. It thereby officially legitimized the climate of xenophobia that had accompanied German reunification. In fact, the relationship between national unity and multiculturalism in Canada constitutes a mirror-image of the German case. While Germany and Canada are similarly preoccupied defining their collective identities, Germany still struggles to accept ethno-cultural diversity. It therefore comes as no surprise that since the 1980s, German intellectuals have been looking to Canada as well as the United States as models in this regard. By contrast, attempts to learn from the German example, when analyzing pluralist models in settler societies are rare.

Hence, this paper juxtaposes the interplay of national unity and ethnic diversity in Germany and Canada. Although both countries have experienced diametrically opposite developments with regard to national integration and the acceptance of ethnocultural diversity, striking parallels can be found as to the employment of ethnicizing semantics and the construction of peoplehood. I maintain that analyzing the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion in a country that has become the *locus classicus* of ethnic nationalism and racial exclusion can help to raise new questions for the study of multiculturalism and citizenship in Canada. Taking its starting point in the post-World War II period, the paper will first describe the

debates on national identity and the “multiculturalization” of society in Germany. Secondly, it will outline the development of multiculturalism as a state policy and situate it in the debates on national unity in Canada. In the final part, the paper compares the semantics of “one people” and “ethnic” nationalism as they appear in intellectual, popular and state policy discourses.² It concludes by outlining the impacts of this unconventional juxtaposition for the examination of nationhood and ethnocultural pluralism in Canada.

National Unity and Intra-German Multiculturalism

In Germany, the term “multicultural society” emerged in the 1980s when it became obvious that the presence of *Ausländer* in German society was neither temporary nor an exception (Cohn-Bendit and Schmid 1992). In the universities, a number of scholars rediscovered Germany’s history of migration (cf. Bade 1992) and studied the first and second generation of guest workers’ integration into the German social fabric (cf. Bielefeld 1988). In public discourse, however, multiculturalism in Germany “is only indirectly about immigrants; primarily it is about the Germans themselves” (Joppke 1998: 300). Given the fact, that Germany has admitted by far the largest number of migrants in Europe since the end of World War II,³ this interpretation of multiculturalism comes as a surprise. However, it confirms Germany’s lack of an explicit immigration policy and the official denial that immigration has taken place. The notion that admission to the nation can only be granted on an exceptional basis derives from Germany’s self-understanding as an “ethnic” nation, i.e., a nation defined by “descent” and shared “culture” (*Kulturnation*). This ideal-type is generally contrasted with the idea of a “civic” nation (*Staatsnation*), grounded in the principle of territory and political will.⁴ Historically, the long uncertainty concerning the territorial borders of the German state-in-the-making lead to a cultural and linguistic definition of German nationhood⁵ that was reinforced by the rivalry with French claims of a “universal” culture and humanism. Appeals to “German” popular culture and vernacular had concrete political meaning at a time when most of the 36 German principalities were occupied by French troops under Napoleon (Stolcke 1997).

Two political reasons led to the implementation of a centralized “ethnic” citizenship law in 1913. Originally, increasing emigration had caused the need to clarify the long-term status of Germans abroad. *Ius sanguinis* gave them the opportunity to maintain their “nationality” and to hand it down to their children (Kanstroom 1993: 174, note 134). Due to rapid industrialization by the end of the 19th century Germany shifted from being an “emigration country” to becoming an “immigration country.” A centralized citizenship law based on descent served to control and limit immigration into the German Reich, especially from Eastern Europe (Bade 1992). The definition of Germanness in explicitly—but not exclusively—racial and biological terms reached its climax under Nazism

(Bommes and Halfmann 1994).⁶ Although the racial laws of the National Socialist regime were dismissed after its downfall, the blood-based German citizenship law was not abandoned after World War II. On the contrary, it was explicitly maintained to allow refugees and displaced persons of German background (*Auslandsdeutsche*) to return and to provide them with settlement rights in the FRG (Bommes and Halfmann 1994). As a result, German citizenship law was, until very recently, based on the *Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz* (Law on the membership to the empire and the state) from 1913 which defined citizenship exclusively on the basis of *ius sanguinis* (Brubaker 1992: 165-167).

For a nation defined in ethnocultural terms, immigration may pose a threat insofar as it undermines the hegemony of its national culture: “There remains no space for multi-ethnicity or multiculturalism if it is believed that the foundation of the state is the national homogeneity of its citizens” (Schmidt 1999: 94). Indeed, “[n]either by tradition nor in terms of the programmes of any federal German government after World War II, did Germany want to be a country of immigration” (Fijalkowski 1998: 86). On the contrary, since the arrival of the first Italian workers in 1955 to overcome the labour shortage of its postwar *Wirtschaftswunder* (economic miracle), Germany has insisted that the newcomers were just “migrants,” i.e., “guests” who were expected to return when recession set in. However, the end of the “guest worker” recruitment in 1973, though it reduced the entry of single male workers, led to an extension of working contracts of those who were already inside and to an increase in family reunification. Not being of “German blood,” these “foreigners” and their children, even if born on German soil, were refused an easy or automatic “naturalization.” Though fully integrated in the welfare state, they remained symbolically and politically excluded from the nation. If the exclusion of “foreigners” from political decision making explains why “multiculturalism in Germany is first and foremost a debate among Germans” (Joppke 1998: 306), their absence from the national imagery confirms Joppke’s statement that multiculturalism in Germany is primarily about the meaning of Germanness. The actual functional integration of “foreigners” into Germany’s social fabric in the 1970s and 1980s—reflected in the replacement of the term “guest workers” by “foreign fellow-citizens” (*ausländische Mitbürger*)—corresponded to the national self-denial of the former Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) which defined itself by the economic well-being of its citizens (“*DM-Nationalismus*”) and an absence of national pride. In fact, what Habermas calls the “patriotism of the constitution,” which suggests a political community kept together by a postnational commitment to abstract constitutional principles, can be considered the official doctrine of the former Federal Republic. It is the direct outcome of German auto-reflection on its Nazi past and denies any legitimacy to the idea of an ethnocultural collective “community of fate” (Habermas 1990: 4, 1997).

Since the Bonn Republic refused to be a “nation” in the strict sense, and ethno-cultural rhetoric was largely absent, the ethnicization migrants was an infrequent phenomenon in German public discourse until the 1980s (Bommes 1994, Braun 1995). However, defining Germany as a single ethnocultural community remained essential for the imagination of a separated nation (one people–two states). It was also an indispensable justification for the FRG’s federal government which over a long time claimed to be Germany’s only legitimate representative. Thus, in failing to engage in a conscious redefinition of German nationhood, (West) Germany did not abandon an “ethnic” self-understanding behind a civic or even “postnational” façade. This became particularly evident by the revival of nationalist themes after the demise of the German Democratic Republic in 1989:

La réunification, imposée par l’écroulement du système communiste et de l’empire soviétique, a brutalement remis en question ce projet politique [du patriotisme constitutionnel]. L’Allemagne ne pouvait plus rester un État-commerçant. Elle était redevenue politiquement souveraine et le gouvernement a du faire dans l’urgence un choix proprement politique [...] de reconstituer une Allemagne comme unité politique et économique en imposant à la population de l’Est le système politique occidental et en exigeant de la population de l’Ouest des sacrifices matériels, au nom d’une identité nationale de l’Allemagne et de l’unité de son peuple (Schnapper 1994: 195-196).

To a larger degree than the former Federal Republic, the reunified Germany is what Castles (1997) calls a model of “differential exclusion,” i.e., migrants are accepted or rejected depending on their cultural background and ethnic origins. Contrary to long-term “foreigners” of non-German background, *Übersiedler* (Germans from the GDR) and large numbers of *Aussiedler* received German citizenship automatically.⁷ When the *Aussiedlers*’ “lack of ability in the German language and their different customs [...] led to criticisms about their ‘Germanness’ and their right to enter Germany as Germans,” the German government proclaimed them “to be the solution to Germany’s demographic problem and vital to the future of the pension scheme” (Schmidt 1999: 99). At the same time, however, “foreigners” were stigmatized as “parasites of the welfare state” (Bommes 1994: 373). As members of the Turkish community in Berlin put it: “When the wall came down, it fell on us.” This perception seems accurate. In January 1991, the admission of non-EU migrants was restricted through a reform of the *Ausländergesetz* (Foreigners’ Law). Only three years later, in June 1993, official anti-immigration rhetoric culminated in changes to the constitutionally guaranteed right of asylum (Grundgesetz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Artikel 16a) in order to reduce the number of asylum seekers:

Restrictive measures are necessary, so runs the official argument, in order to guarantee public order. This is conveyed through a

language and imagery of threat: the lack of space and resources to accommodate more foreigners, the jeopardizing of social peace through *Überfremdung* [domination through “foreign” cultures and people], and the inability or unwillingness to integrate (Schmidt 1999: 102).

The alteration of the constitution for the sake of restricting the acceptance of refugees has had a symbolic connotation. It demonstrates the readiness of a reunified Germany to change its proclaimed non-ethnic self-understanding where before the protection of refugees was a fundamental characteristic of German society and identity. It also exposes the peculiar situation of long term “foreigners” (e.g., of Italian, Turkish or Greek background). Thus where “Germans without a German passport” are being excluded from the nation, “ethnic Germans” (mostly from Russia, i.e., “foreigners with a German passport”) receive automatic membership. *De facto* multiculturalism has become a social fact, but it has not led to an egalitarian state policy. Rather, the “mosaic” is perceived in “degrees” of Germanness, with legal citizenship an institutionalized division between insiders (Germans) and outsiders (“foreigners”) living in the same territory.⁸ In the 1990s, Joppke observes, the foreign-German dualism is reflected in an intra-German polarization between a “crypto-voelkisch right” and a “postnational multiculturalist left.” The former defends the constitutional and moral commitments owing to East Germans and “ethnic Germans,” and insists that “Germany is not an immigration country.” The latter, by contrast, intends to “bury the dreadful ghost of the *voelkisch* national tradition by siding with ‘foreigners’ and asylum seekers” (1998: 300-305). The multiculturalism proposed by the political left is “not so much about *redefining* as about *transcending* nationhood altogether” (1998: 302). These radical ideologies, with pro-German “differential inclusion” as the dominant voice, and “post-nationalism” as an idealistic movement of resistance, led to a sort of “intra-German multiculturalism” with descent as the ultimate marker, and culture (language, place of birth) as internal markers of ethnic “honour” and rank. While divisions between West and East Germans still remain (McFalls 1999), these populations certainly rank first and second in the new ethnocentric hierarchy.

At the beginning of the 21st century, the political conditions for a positive definition of in-migration and ethnocultural pluralism have improved. The current government, a coalition of the Social Democrats and the Green Party elected in 1998, openly acknowledged that Germany has become *de facto* a country of immigration, and promised to address issues of citizenship and long-term integration. This political shift, however, is neither complete nor without obstacles. The government’s proposal to legalize dual citizenship for long-term “foreign” residents has been contested vehemently by the opposition (mainly Christian Democrats, CDU/CSU).⁹ As a compromise, the new citizenship law of January 2000 adds the territorial principle (*ius soli*) to the existing German citizenship law based on descent (*ius sanguinis*). It also provides for dual citizenship on

a temporary basis.¹⁰ Although being considered a step in the right direction by the German Council for Migration (*Rat für Migration*, cf. Bade and Münz 2000), the new law only addresses the legal aspects of citizenship (citizenship as a status). A second step, a policy encouraging integration and normative pluralism, is necessary to provide for the full participation of “foreigners” in German society, and to address citizenship as a set of social practices and identifications. Along with this quest must come the insight that integration is a two-way process involving both “foreigners” and the “host society.”¹¹ However, to defend this perspective in the German context has so far proven to be politically risky, as shown by the debate over a German “core culture” (*Leitkultur*) which “foreigners” must adopt.

The government’s initiative to hand out 10,000 “Green Cards” to attract highly skilled professionals—particularly targeted are computer scientist from India—is only a half-hearted attempt to provide instant manpower for the German labour market in a context of rapidly decreasing demographics (Münz and Ulrich 2000). Without being flanked by policies addressing issues of immigration, integration and xenophobia, the distribution of “Green Cards” can be seen as the continuity of the *Gastarbeiter* model adapted to the changing needs of a high-skilled flexible economy.¹² Sure enough, future “in-migrants” could indeed be celebrated as a new part of the nation on the Day of German Unity (*Tag der Einheit*), as Oberndörfer (2001: 14) suggests. However, public discourse and politics indicate that instead of being an equal “third part” of a reunified country, “foreign employees” are primarily viewed as a “third labour force”—welcomed by the German high-tech-economy, but still excluded from the symbolic, cultural and political realm of the nation. Although the recently published report of the Independent Commission for In-Migration (Süssmuth *et al.* 2001) defends the actual state and normative goal of Germany as an “immigration country,” the step from in-migration (*Zuwanderung*) to immigration (*Einwanderung*) and multicultural integration has yet to be taken.

In Canada, by contrast, the relationship between duality and immigrant integration has taken a fundamentally different turn. Whereas in Canada a relatively successful answer to ethnocultural diversity has been achieved, the country stands at the edge of national separation. Although national unity and ethnocultural diversity in Canada constitute a mirror-image of the German case, the next section shows that the inherent logic of multiculturalism, defined as the extension of social and political inclusion of culturally diverse populations, runs along similar lines in both countries.

“Deep Diversity” and Canadian Multicultural Citizenship

While Canada began actively recruiting non-British immigrants during its “wheat boom” of the early 20th century, it only became “multicultural” in the post-World War II period. Changes in the world system led to increasing opposition towards “anglo-conformity” (Gordon 1964). This term reflects

the assumption that “immigrants admitted to the country or their descendants [would] assimilate to the British group,” which was until then Canada’s dominant ideology (Burnet and Palmer 1988: 223). Two global developments influenced Canada’s response towards ethno-cultural diversity. First, the same economic growth that led Germany to recruit “guest workers” from southern Europe forced Canada to open its borders to immigrants coming from places other than the traditional sources in Northern and Central Europe. In 1967, the federal government implemented a supposedly “race blind” universal point system emphasizing professional and educational qualifications as well as personal attributes (such as age and language skills) as a basis of eligibility for immigration. This policy replaced immigrant selection according to “national preference.”¹³ Workers were now primarily recruited from Southern Europe and later increasingly from Asia, Africa, South America and the Caribbean. Thus more “visible” minorities were admitted to Canadian society. Although the metaphor of the Canadian mosaic suggested less assimilationism than the American “melting pot,” ethnicity continued to work as a crucial mechanism for sorting social groups along class lines. Porter’s (1965) dramatic picture of Canadian society as a “vertical mosaic” does thus not differ much from the “ethnic vertical structure” in German society revealed by Bielefeld (1988).

Second, decolonization and the “world revolution” in human rights, demonstrated by the proceedings of the Nuremberg Trials, the civil rights movement in the United States and the war in Algeria, inspired Quebec’s “Quiet Revolution,” and paved the way for the political emergence of Canada’s Aboriginal peoples as “First Nations” during the late 1970s and 1980s. The “Quiet Revolution” refers to the period following the election of a Liberal government in Quebec in 1960 when the modernization, expansion and bureaucratization of the Quebec State apparatus gave rise to the development of a *Québécois* social identity. The transition from French-Canadian language- and religion-based identity to *Québécois* “national” identity was reinforced by the fact that French culture and language were more and more centred on the province of Quebec (Juteau 1993, McRoberts 1997).¹⁴ This shift to a territorial basis of identification had a direct impact on the forms of pluralism (from cultural to structural) demanded in the public sphere. The power of *Québécois* nationalism as opposed to French Canadian nationalism, led to the creation of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism by the federal government in 1963. The commission was established on the assumption that Canadian society was composed of two linguistic and cultural groups whose fundamental relationship needed clarifying. While giving priority to a culturalist interpretation of dualism in Canada, the commission also took into account forms of structural dualism based on territoriality—implemented through the separation of Lower and Upper Canada in 1789—and the recognition of two official legislatures in the Constitution Act of 1791.¹⁵ Nevertheless, throughout the time of investigation, the terminology used by

the commission shifted from the equality of groups to the equality of languages and cultures:

Canadiens français et Canadiens anglais deviennent des francophones et des anglophones. De l'égalité entre deux peuples qui ont fondé la Confédération canadienne, l'on passe, dans le rapport préliminaire de la Commission d'enquête, à l'égalité entre le peuple anglophone et le peuple francophone, puis à l'égalité entre deux langues et deux cultures au sein d'un Etat bilingue et biculturel (Juteau 2000: 17).

This shift can be explained, at least in part, by an increasing number of Canadians that did not belong to one of the two founding peoples. Slowly gaining political influence the “other ethnic groups” had become a “third force” in Canadian politics.¹⁶ Their voice provoked the members of the B&B Commission, while reiterating their perception of Canada as a bicultural country, to “take into account the contribution made by the other ethnic groups to the cultural enrichment of Canada” (Canada, Bilingual and & Bicultural Commission, Volume IV 1969).¹⁷ In his speech to the House of Commons in October 1971, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau declared that “multiculturalism within a bilingual framework” not only constituted an official state policy but was also the essence of Canadian identity. Though there are two official languages, there is no official culture and no ethnic group should take precedence over any other. On the one hand, this policy marked the passage from assimilationism to normative pluralism in Canada. On the other, it is often evoked in attempts to sidestep Quebec’s claims for constitutional recognition of its distinctiveness, and to avoid strengthening structural pluralism in Canada. As Juteau puts it, a political choice had been made to move “from bi-nationalism to bilingualism, and from bi-culturalism to multiculturalism” (2000: 18, my translation).

Despite the rhetoric of its being for all Canadians, multiculturalism was directed chiefly to “ethnic minorities.” By contrast, official bilingualism, institutionalized in the Official Languages Act of 1969, was implemented to meet the demands of French Canadians (Kobayashi 1993: 215-216, McRoberts 1997: 78-116). While the latter provoked much contention in Western Canada, the Francophones of Quebec and Aboriginal peoples, seeing themselves as separate nations and not as immigrant-type ethnic groups, rejected multiculturalism as a political strategy aiming at the cooptation of “third force” Canadians. In fact, there was a widespread impression that multiculturalism was a deliberate effort to thwart Quebec’s thrust towards greater independence (Rocher 1971, Bissoondath 1994). Aboriginal peoples were mentioned neither in the 1969 Official Languages Act nor in the 1971 declaration of multiculturalism. Being of relative little importance to Canadian political life in the 1960s (Laczko 1997: 4), their leaders fought a largely unnoticed fight against the assimilationism of the federal government’s 1969 White Paper. The later proposed the elimination of all government arrangements that specifically addressed native affairs,

including the Indian Act and the very existence of a Department of Indian Affairs (Canadian Government 1969, Cairns 2000: 51-53).

In the decade after its announcement, the Trudeau multiculturalism policy focused on symbolic rather than on material matters (Breton 1984) thereby promoting a sort of “museum culture” (Kelner and Kallen 1974). It remained silent about political and economic inequalities (Moodley 1983), and failed to initiate a political dialogue concerning the role of Quebec in Canada (Brotz 1980). On the one hand, “[m]ulticulturalism, so it seemed, was blind to the power relations which had engendered it” (Juteau 1997: 105). On the other hand, by “strengthening the base of community support, especially among the non-charter groups, multiculturalism had become a self-fulfilling prophecy” (Kobayashi 1993: 218). This became evident in the 1980s, when multiculturalism policy shifted its focus from heritage issues (symbolic multiculturalism) to equity issues (structural multiculturalism), and this much against the protest of previously established “ethnic groups” of European background (McRoberts 1997: 127). In line with this redefinition of priorities, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms—an integral part of the Constitution Act in 1982—guarantees equality before the law to every Canadian citizen, and explicitly opposes discrimination on the basis of nationality, ethnicity, religion, sex, skin colour, or mental or physical disability. Even though the original idea of the Charter was inspired by an individualist conception of human rights—heavily supported by Trudeau (McRoberts 1997: 137-175)—the final outcome was a mixture of liberalism and identity politics (Bourque and Duchastel 1995: 35-36). If the federal government needed the support of social movements and the defendants of minority rights in order to repatriate the Constitution, it was nonetheless ready and able to do so without the support of Quebec, which did not sign the Charter because of the ways it enabled the supreme court of Canada to invalidate Quebec’s laws and regulations in the name of individual rights:

[...] le Québec n'a pas adhéré à la Loi constitutionnelle de 1982 et [vingt] ans plus tard on n'a pas encore trouvé de solutions acceptables aux revendications des nations autochtones. Voilà donc une Constitution qui exclut plus du quart de la population d'un pays! C'est le problème fondamental de la légitimité de l'État [...] (Bourque and Duchastel 1995: 34).

Explicitly excluding a quarter of the Canadian population, the repatriation of the Constitution that concluded Canada’s official existence as a British transnational project, gave way to a “particularized” version of citizenship, i.e., a (multicultural) citizenship that recognizes and encourages certain forms of group-membership and belonging while it disclaims the legitimacy of others. It goes beyond the scope of this paper to enter the theoretical debate on group-differentiated citizenship.¹⁸ However, let us focus on the strange parallelism between the development of

multiculturalism as a state policy and increasingly unsuccessful constitutional negotiations.

In addition to promoting the *multiculturalization* of public life the federal government acknowledges the necessity of combating racism. In 1984, an official report "Equality Now!" speaks of Canada's "visible minorities" as being practically "invisible" in all areas of power. Hence the need to promote their equal access to employment, public policy, justice, media and education. The "Multiculturalism Act," implemented in 1988, guarantees each Canadian the possibility of participating in all aspects of social life in Canada regardless of his or her culture of origin. Social, economic and political institutions are called upon to respect and embody the multicultural character of the country. Official sources have characterized the Multiculturalism Act as the climax of a long period of liberalization. Nevertheless, even structural multiculturalism seems unable to erase the ethnicization of social inequalities (Driedger 1996). Some authors claim that it camouflages increasing racism by hiding power structures under the mask of "unity in diversity" (Bannerji 2000). In addition, the 1988 legislation only addresses what Charles Taylor (1993) has called "first level" diversity, i.e., a relative homogenizing expression of individual-based belonging to the Canadian nation shared by ethnic minorities and English-speaking Canadians. In fact, the collective rights promoted by multiculturalism do not reach far enough to include "second level diversity," or "deep diversity." Ultimately, the expression of community-based belonging to Canada formulated by French-speaking Quebecers and Aboriginal peoples ("First Nations") remains excluded from multiculturalism¹⁹.

This interpretation of multiculturalism has been reinforced in the last decade. With the emphasis on equal rights rather than on specifically defined culture(s), multiculturalism in the 1990s became increasingly linked to the idea of citizenship (Kymlicka and Norman 1994). At the same time, various attempts to integrate Quebec into the Constitution failed. The Meech Lake Accord of 1987, while granting the "distinct society" status to Quebec, remained non-ratified by the provincial parliaments of Newfoundland and Manitoba.²⁰ The centerpiece of the Meech Lake Accord was the recognition of Quebec's distinctiveness. It would have provided constitutional protection against the centralizing and universalizing tendencies of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In particular, it would have allowed collective rights to trump over individual rights where Quebec's language and culture were seen to be endangered. Ultimately, it was the procedural obstruction of the Elijah Harper, an Aboriginal member of the Manitoba Legislature that caused the agreement to collapse on June 23 1990. Harper refused to approve the Accord on the grounds that it put Quebec's needs ahead of those of Canada's Aboriginal peoples. This powerful demonstration of the emergence of "First Nations" on the political scene led to changing political allegiances. Previously Francophone

Canadians had shown strong support for Aboriginal issues. However, polls in the 1990s indicate that after the failure of the Meech Lake Accord and the 1990 Oka crisis—land disputes between Mohawks and a *Québécois* municipality—Quebeckers tend to take a harder line than before. Anglophone Canadians, by contrast, seem to have become more sympathetic to Aboriginal issues (Laczko 1997: 6-7). Finally, despite all efforts, in 1992, the struggle to accommodate constitutionally a multiplicity of often contradictory claims raised not only by Quebec and First Nations, but also by the federal government, the remaining provinces and various interest groups (women, ethnic groups, disabled, etc.) ended in vain: "[...] *la saga constitutionnelle canadienne s'est abîmée dans une sorte de tragicomédie qui a conduit au rejet de l'entente de Charlottetown, à l'occasion du référendum de 1992*" (Burke and Duchastel 1995: 20).

While multiculturalism became officially enshrined through the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the 1988 Canadian Multiculturalism Act²¹, the constitutional debates of the late 1980s and 1990s also witnessed increasing concerns about Quebec's nationalism being "ethnic" and incompatible with the "civic" and liberal understanding of the Canadian state-nation. Commentators claimed that the 1987 Meech Lake Accord proposed an "implicit hierarchy of rights" (MacKay 1988: 76). Granting collective rights to Quebec was viewed as preferential treatment for a relatively privileged group—the white male French-speaking bourgeoisie—over other Canadian minorities, such as women, more recent immigrants, and Aboriginal peoples (e.g. Mahoney 1988, Hall 1991). Doubts were also raised whether an independent Quebec would respect the rights of minority groups living on its territory. Especially the language rights of "Allophones" and English-speaking Quebecers seemed at risk (Hartney 1995). In his book *Blood and Belonging*, Michael Ignatieff (1994) aligns Quebec's struggle for recognition with the "ethnic" nationalisms he observes in Yugoslavia, Kurdistan, Ukraine, Germany and Ulster. According to this author, Quebec's secessionism is not only illegitimate—since French-speaking Canadians do not face oppression or even the risk of extinction (Ignatieff 2000: 133); it is also highly dangerous, since only "civic" nationalism seems to be compatible with liberalism, democracy and peace.²² This view seemed to be justified when Quebec's Premier Jacques Parizeau blamed "money and the ethnic vote" (meaning anglophone Quebecers and immigrants) for losing the latest referendum on sovereignty in October 1995.²³ The outcome of the referendum, where only 50.6 percent of Quebec's population voted against the province's independence, showed the deep cleavages in Canadian and *Québécois* society. The close outcome has led to a wave of "post-referendary racism" against Francophone Quebecers in English-speaking media (Potvin 1998, 2000). Even in academia, "[o]therwise sensible and intelligent people have lost their perspective on these matters. They invoke apocalyptic scenarios of segregation and violence [...]. It is not uncommon to hear commentators point ominously to Bosnia or South Africa, as if we were on some slippery

slope to civil war or apartheid" (Kymlicka 1998: 4). In fact, a number of prominent English Canadian and American intellectuals have accused Quebec nationalism of having an "ethnic heart" (Ignatieff 2000: 132) and hosting the dangers of "ethnic cleansing" (Cook 1995: 245) as well as civil war (McPershon 1999).

This picture is quite at odds with social reality in Quebec where, since 1975, article 43 of the *Charte des droits et libertés* recognizes the cultural rights of ethnic minorities (Gouvernement du Québec 1978), and where "interculturalism," a policy with only slightly different philosophical presumptions than multiculturalism, has been adopted in the late 1970s without raising much debate or contradiction (Juteau, McAndrew and Pietrantonio 1996).²⁴ Why are the semantics of *Québécois* "ethnic" nationalism so compelling? Weariness due to the failure to solve the Quebec question "once and for all," and scepticism evoked by the fine line between ethno-cultural and ethno-racial definitions of community—as shown by the German case—can only partly explain the widespread opposition to articulations of *Québécois* nationhood. On the contrary, Quebec's full-fledged support for the free trade negotiations in 1988 reveals that its nationalism is far from being "pre-modern" or regressive. Instead of celebrating this as a progressive expression of Quebec's "opening to the world," many English Canadians viewed Quebec's "market nationalism" (Courchene 1986) as an act of treachery. They felt that Quebec lacked loyalty at a point when (English) Canadian identity was threatened to be jeopardized by the cultural and economic supremacy of its dominant American Other. Hence, "[t]he anglophone left had never been so outspokenly negative about Quebec before" (Longstaff 1992: 37). It goes beyond the scope of this paper to discuss whether it was the "ethnic" character of Quebec's nationalism or the sudden neo-liberal orientation of the *Parti québécois* that inspired the rediscovery of English Canadian nationalism in the late 1980s. In any case, subsequent attempts to think "English Canada" as a "nation" (Resnick 1994) emphasize the commitment to a liberal and multicultural (English) Canadian society. They thereby imply a new set of opposing entities: Multicultural Canada versus Quebec.

The common practice of framing ROC-Quebec relations as a civic/ethnic dilemma has recently been questioned: "what is ultimately in contention today is a civic versus civic version of what the overarching state structure ought to be" (Resnick 2001: 291). Although various authors insist that contemporary *Québécois* "independentism" is deeply liberal (Taylor 1998, Kymlicka 2001), the dualism itself remains crucial. Kymlicka's (1995a) important conceptualization of "multicultural citizenship," for example, differentiates between three types of minority rights. It opposes "self-government rights" to "polyethnic" and "special representation rights." While the two latter are interpreted as quests of inclusion, and can therefore be accommodated, Kymlicka refers to the potential destructiveness of Québec's "separatism" to define the limits of Canadian

multicultural citizenship. For Kymlicka, the inclusion of ethnic groups is an achievement of liberalism—put into practice by the (English) Canadian society. His theory, however, is based on an unequal power distribution: ethnocultural communities' polyethnic and special representation rights are "given to them by an Invisible Self group" (Day 2000: 215-216). This inequality between "natural" members of the we-group and "contingent insiders" is camouflaged by the devise of contrasting "generous" multicultural citizenship rights with the threat of "separatism" or, at least, the difficult task of accommodating Quebec's and First Nations' "self-government rights." Both, according to Kymlicka (1995a: 192), "pose a threat to social unity." Thus, neither on a constitutional nor on a theoretical level is Canadian "multicultural citizenship" universal. Empirically the inclusion of some groups—through the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Multiculturalism Act—is paralleled by the exclusion of others: most obviously in the failure to provide constitutional recognition to Quebec as a "distinct society." But even in theory, Quebec's claims for equality and distinctiveness are difficult to reconcile within a single concept of citizenship.

Ironically, the claims of a fourth group, equally excluded and symbolized by Aboriginal MLA Elijah Harper, are associated with the failure of Quebec's constitutional inclusion. Harper's opposition to the Meech Lake Accord brought dramatically to public and state attention the fact that Aboriginal issues could be ignored no longer. In recent years, the notion of a multi-national Canadian state-system has gained some acceptance (Cairns 1994, MacIver 1999). However, as with multiculturalism, this perspective implies both, containment and concession. It negates the exclusiveness of Quebec's claims of distinctiveness, and includes instead moderate forms of self-government rights in the logic of a unifying pluralism (e.g., the creation of Nunavut in 1998). Despite or, on the contrary, due to these attempts, *Québécois* and First Nations remain at the margins of the federal government's "national unity" strategy. In fact, "[t]he sort of 'multination' federalism desired by most *Québécois* and Aboriginal peoples rests on a model of federalism fundamentally opposed to the model of symmetrical federalism that is endorsed by the (non-Aboriginal, non-*Québécois*) majority in Canada" (Kymlicka 1998: 10). These cleavages suggest that the question of *Québécois* sovereignty has not disappeared from the horizon. Indeed, the possibility of a new referendum has been underlined repeatedly by Premier Bernard Landry over the course of the last year (Thompson 2001).

Rethinking the Logic of Inclusion

Why juxtapose the very different cases of ethnic diversity and "multiculturalism" in Germany and Canada? At least from a German point of view, Canada resolved the challenge of (first level) diversity in a relative successful way by adopting multiculturalism as an official state policy.

However, it has so far failed to overcome a debilitating Quebec-ROC dualism, and a Canada-Aboriginal Peoples divide. Refusing to integrate Quebec's national identity in its normative approach to diversity, Canada may well be losing its chance of stable constitutional arrangements. By contrast, Germany achieved national reunification at the price of ethnicizing "foreigners." Since unity is based on a notion of "one-people," Germany has yet to enlarge its ethno-cultural national self-understanding to include long term "non-Germans" in its national imagery. This section abstracts from these obvious differences and focuses on the underlying logic of inclusion and exclusion in both countries. It will argue that analyzing the ethnicizing discourses in Germany may shed some light on the Quebec-Canadian dualism and its relationship towards multiculturalism.

Though fundamentally different in terms of history, population and geography, Germany and Canada are both divided countries. Both have had to cope with major cleavages and elements of "dualism," struggle over their collective identity, and debate over alternative strategies to build some form of "post-national" unity and identification. The reasons, of course, are very different. Germany still struggles with the memory of its *Sonderweg* ("special trajectory") as an "ethnic" nation. The historical "production" of the German nation and the discourses of shared culture, language and ancestry that accompanied this process are of particular interest for the Canadian case of multi-nationalism. They demonstrate the political nature of "ethnicity" and its significance as a means of resistance. Popular and linguistic nationalism as it is expressed in German romanticism opposed French military occupation and claims of cultural hegemony. French was not only the language of the oppressor, it was also the predominant language spoken by the (German) aristocracy at their respective courts. This suggests that "ethnic" or minority nationalism—to use Kymlicka's terminology—is a response to "civic" nation-building, and cannot be properly understood if analyzed as an isolated phenomenon. "Civic" and "ethnic" forms of nationhood are heavily interdependent. While dominant groups often claim to embody a "universal" civilization, national minorities confront this "majority nationalism" by referring to their "difference"—distinctive culture, language, etc.—in order to mobilize large segments of their population: "*Le culturalisme québécois, tout comme d'ailleurs le culturalisme autochtone, résulte de [la] nécessité constitutive de tout nationalisme issu d'une minorité de poser la différence culturelle*" (Bourque et Duchastel 1995: 45). The existence of minority nationalisms in any given context should therefore draw our attention to the diverse forms of "banal nationalism" (Billig 1995) exercised by national majorities. Scholarship on naturalistic and gendered notions of citizenship in Germany and France suggests, that practices of "ethnic" and "civic" nations do not differ fundamentally (Stolcke 1997, Woehrling 2000). Studies on the historical "production" of the *Québécois* nation (Juteau 1993) and ways of dealing with ethnocultural diversity and citizenship in Quebec and Canada

point in the same direction: on an empirical level there are no fundamental differences with regards to the inclusion and exclusion of immigrants (Juteau and McAndrew 1992, McAndrew 1995).

Should we therefore abandon the concepts of civic and ethnic nationalism, and simply refer, as Resnick suggests, to a "civic versus civic" debate in Canada? Experience with the German case and other minority struggles leads me to reject this proposal. Ethnic and civic nationalisms allude to different historical positions of power held by groups and nations in their respective "national" or international contexts. On the one hand, the awareness of the group's "ethnic" self is necessary to reveal "banal nationalism" and to admit the cultural nature of the nation's supposedly "neutral" institutions. Recognizing one's own culture and ethnicity seems to enhance some sympathy for other groups' cultural struggles and values. This tendency can be found in Herder's romanticism (1968). It is also demonstrated by the sympathy of French Quebecers towards minority issues, "interracial" marriages, and immigrant cultural heritage retention (Laczko 1997, Kymlicka 2001: 281). On the other hand, their present or historic position in the context of power relations provides "ethnic" nations with a rich collective memory of "community" often imagined in terms of cultural-linguistic or ethnic-biological homogeneity. Although there is no intrinsic "clash of civilizations" between "civic" and "ethnic" visions of collectivity and nationhood, "ethnic" nations possess substantial historical material that can be revived for the means of group closure in times of economic stress and demagogic. Examples taken from Quebec (Webber 1999), but more specifically the history of defining German nationality, suggest that we should not simply discard the concepts of ethnic and civic nationalism. As heuristic tools they warn us that, once established, collective imagines of the nation become embodied in laws and practices that are subsequently difficult to change. Hence, as response to their real or imagined minority position, "ethnic" nations have tended to use more drastic means to create a collective will, and to exclude "outsiders" in the name of group solidarity and "survival."

Nevertheless, "civic" nations are not free from the need to employ ethnicizing discourses in order to justify the closure of their communities. In Canada, this is especially evident in the constitutional failure to recognize Quebec's distinctiveness—a failure that is often rationalized by allegations that Quebec's *independentist* aspirations are deeply tribal and regressive. Thus, scrutinizing the logic of inclusion in Germany and Canada obliges us to revise the taken-for-granted opposition between homogenizing "old world" nation-states and pluralist immigration countries. It has often been overlooked that lacking the possibility to experience or imagine ethnocultural homogeneity "new-world" settler societies tend to invest heavily in "nationalizing" practices. However, the strategies employed are indeed different from the cultural coercion practiced traditionally by nation-states in Europe in the name of "One

people" or "The common good." In Canada, they also differ from the nation-building device of making "one (American) culture out of many." This explains why the sociological relationship between the discursive construction of "ethnic" nationalism and constitutional repatriation passed largely unnoticed. By contrast, in the German case, the link between national semantics, reunification and the ethnicization of "foreigners" has been widely debated. Juxtaposing both countries shows that further research is necessary in order to identify to what degree Quebec's "ethnic" nationalism is an indispensable counter-image for the construction of (English) Canada as an open, pluralist state-nation. To explain this statement let me—*en guise de conclusion*—recapitulate my argument.

Conclusion

Germany's national imagery allowed for the inclusion of East Germans and "ethnic Germans" from the former Soviet-Union. It thus promoted a rather limited "intra-German" version of "multicultural" citizenship. "National" reunification was paralleled by the projection of "difference" (or *Fremdheit*) on "foreigners" (Germans with a foreign passport) and xenophobia in both parts of the country. These developments created an environment where the 1993 changes to Article 16a of the Constitution stipulating the right of asylum passed nearly unchallenged in the German parliament. In Canada, at about the same historical period, various attempts to include Quebec into the repatriated Constitution failed, multiculturalism as an official state policy reached maturity, and warnings about *Québécois* "ethnic" nationalism were widespread. Focusing on the links between ethnicizing discourses, national reunification and immigrant exclusion in a Germany undergoing a stressful reunification, leads me to conclude that in Canada there may be a similar relationship between ethnicizing discourses, so far unsuccessful efforts to accommodate Quebec's distinctiveness constitutionally (i.e., national division), and multiculturalism as a state policy (i.e., immigrant inclusion). Canadian (second level) "deep diversity" is not disconnected from (first level) multicultural inclusion. Rather, national unity or inclusion at the price of "ethnic" exclusion in Germany translates into national division versus multiculturalism in Canada. In fact, if Canadian "multicultural citizenship" is defined in relation to the potential destructiveness of Quebec's "separatism"—the latter being politically more powerful and threatening than articulations of nationalism made by First Nations—national and political disunity may indeed contribute to the cultural and economic inclusion of immigrants. In other words, granting special representation and polyethnic rights to English-speaking/assimilating immigrants seems of minor importance compared to the threat of *Québécois* "ethnic" nationalism. In this picture, Aboriginal peoples' self-government and land claims—though difficult to accommodate—serve to balance and erase the exclusiveness of Quebec's demands for recognition and autonomy.

Notes

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- 1. The English translation does not provide the full connotation. In the German context, *Ausländer* are people who do not possess German "nationality" or "ethnic origin," but who are long-term residents of Germany.
- 2. Given the large scope of this task, the sources quoted are neither complete nor strictly systematic. Rather, they are examples that evoke the tendencies implied in different types of discourse. Given the limited space available, I can only provide rough sketches of the intellectual positions referred to. The underlying theoretical arguments are often complex and deserve to be discussed at length.
- 3. The net intake between 1945 and 1992 was more than twenty million people. In addition, the opening of the borders between Eastern and Western Europe, following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, led to an increase in east-west migration (Schmidt 1999: 98, 96). Today, more than 7 million "foreigners" live in Germany; that is roughly 10% of the population.
- 4. The dichotomy between the French *Staatsnation* and the German *Kulturnation* was first suggested by Meinecke (1970), and has been elaborated by many others (cf. Kohn 1967, Dumont 1991, Brubaker 1992). Recently, the assumed contrast between ethnic and civic nationalism has become under attack. Neither model can be found in its pure form in reality, and so-called civic nations ultimately can not abide complete ethnic neutrality (Yuval-Davis 1997, Taylor 1998, Wöhrling 2000). I have discussed the theoretical underpinnings of the dichotomy elsewhere (Winter 2000).
- 5. Whereas Herder insisted on the value and the authenticity of each "people" (*Volk*), for Fichte, the German people becomes the *Urvolk* and non-Germanic language, ideas and traditions are reduced to *Ausländer*, i.e., the despicable imitation of "foreign stuff."
- 6. The German writers Herder and Fichte merely extended the principle of equal dignity of individuals to the idea of equal rights for culturally defined groups. However, cultural consciousness and "holism" were subsequently interpreted as submission of the individual to the "community." Under Nazism, the concept of the individual lost its entire value in favour of the German people and "race." The boundaries for membership shifted from cultural-linguistic to racial-political definitions, excluding primarily Jews but also communists, socialists and disabled persons.
- 7. The term *Aussiedler* stipulates "resettlers" of German background (or "ethnic Germans") from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Between 1989 and 1992 more than 1.2 million "resettlers" came to Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt 1993).
- 8. With the exception of the former Yugoslavia, Turkey and the North African countries (e.g., Algeria), all countries involved in the former recruitment processes have gained membership in the European Community. Their citizens thus enjoy an unrestricted right to seek employment in the member states

(Fijalkowski 1998). Other bilateral or EU agreements have been established with some East European countries and Turkey. This way an "intermediate" status for an excluded group has been created (Schmidt 1999: 104).

9. During the provincial election in the *Land* Hessen, the CDU conducted an ethno-national campaign and "referendum," arguing that dual citizenship was undermining the *Ausländer*s' loyalty to Germany and thereby hindering successful integration.
10. Children born in Germany whose parents do not hold German citizenship, and with at least one parent as a legal resident will automatically obtain German citizenship in addition to their "foreign" citizenship. However, dual citizenship may only be held until the age of 24 when a decision has to be made. The citizenship law also reduces the necessary period of legal residence before potential "naturalization" from 15 to 8 years (Inter-Nations 1999).
11. The implied contrast between "foreigners" and host society is characteristic. A mutual adaptation process is generally considered to take place between "immigrants" or "newcomers" and the receiving society. However, nearly half of the more than 7 million "foreigners" have been living in Germany for more than ten years. Instead of being considered members of the host society, they are both, excluded from the national imagery and reproached for creating "distinct societies" (*Parallelgesellschaften*), (Oberndörfer 2001).
12. In summer 2000 the German government provided 10,000 "Green Cards" for highly skilled "foreign" professionals. The Green Card allows "foreigners" and their families to live and work in Germany for a period up to five years. Applicants need a job offer from a company in Germany providing them with a salary of at least DM 100,000. The number of available Green Cards has recently been raised to 20,000. In several provinces (*Bundesländer*) Blue Cards enable the employment of "foreigners" in German IT-companies without any visa or work permit restrictions.
13. The official position of Canadian immigration policy and practice since the 1960s has been "non-racist," yet studies revealed specific features of Canadian immigration policy that are implicitly favouring immigrants from European sources and reproduce an ethnic and racial stratification of Canadian society. For a discussion of racism in Canadian immigration policy, see Simmons 1998.
14. The power of *Québécois* nationalism was expressed by the election of the *Parti Québécois* (with René Lévesque as Premier) in 1976.
15. Structural pluralism was strengthened by the integration of the United Canadas in the enlarged British North America in 1867 (Tully 1995). However, its interpretation then shifted from dualism to federalism (McRoberts 1997). Distinct visions of the meaning of Confederation have been haunting the country since. They can be summarized in the fundamental question whether Canada is made up of two "founding nations" (plus Aboriginal "First Nations") or of a series of equal provinces (Gagnon and Laforest 1993).
16. The term "third force" is attributed to Senator Paul Yuzyk. He introduced this term in his first speech before the Senate on 3 May 1964 (Kelner and Kallen 1974: 33).
17. For a critical reading of the recommendations of the B&B Commission and their incorporation into dominant politics, see Rocher 1971, McRoberts 1997, Day 2000.
18. For different perspectives on group-differentiated citizenship see for example Kymlicka 1995b and Isin and Wood 1999.

19. Although Quebec and First Nations are both excluded from multiculturalism, we must not overlook their fundamental differences. Due to specific characteristics such as territory, institutional completeness, and degree of exclusion (access to resources), indigenous peoples generally "want some form of autonomy within a larger state, rather than seeking secession" (Kymlicka 2001: 124), i.e., their claims for self-government do not put the territorial integrity of the country at risk. This does not downplay the rightfulness of their cause. Rather the opposite. Whereas Quebec has achieved "community closure" (Weber), and the power to pose the question of secession in the public space, First Nations in Canada are widely deprived of the means to monopolize status and resources for their members. For further discussion of the distinction between indigenous peoples and stateless nations, see Guibernau 1999.
20. For detailed and contradictory analyses of the multiple reasons that contributed to the failure of the proposed Meech Lake Accord and the Charlottetown Accord, see the contributions in Cook (1994), Swinton and Rogerson (1988), Gibbins (1988), Meisel, Rocher and Silver (1999), as well as Breton (1992) and Bourque and Duchastel (1996).
21. Bill C-93 recognizes and promotes the understanding that multiculturalism is "a fundamental characteristic of the Canadian heritage and identity" (Canadian Government 1988).
22. For a critical review of Ignatieff's *Blood and Belonging*, see Kymlicka 2001: 242-253.
23. It goes beyond the scope of this paper to discuss to what degree *Québécois* nationalism is "ethnic" or "liberal." For critical examinations of *Québécois* citizenship and ethnicity see El Yamani 1996, Elmer and Abramson 1997, Juteau 2000b.
24. With regard to interculturalism in Quebec, the "preferred metaphor, as opposed to the *mosaic*, was that of the *tree* into which various rootstocks are grafted. A culture of convergence, composed of a solid core based on Quebec traditions would then be called upon to enrich itself with contributions from minority cultures" (McAndrew 1996).

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